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X.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this
Divorce matter pursuant to Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated
1953 as amended;

Rules 52(a) and 63(b) Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
DOES RONALD'S JUNE 5, 1995 "REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE ANTHONY
SCHOFIELD" CONSTITUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE AND IF
SO, WAS IT IMPROPER FOR THE JUDGE TO ISSUE HIS OWN RULING DENYING
THE REQUEST AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE EFFECT ON RONALD OF ANY ORDERS
ISSUED BY HIM THEREAFTER?
- STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Once an affidavit is filed questioning the neutrality of the
judge, the judge must either certify the affidavit to another
judge for review or transfer the case. - Rule 63(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct App.
1994); Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962).
The record contains papers filed June 5, 1995 encaptioned
"Request for Recusal of Judge Anthony Schofield" and the record
also contains the court's own Ruling dated June 7, 1995.

II.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE UPON WHICH IT SOLELY RELIED IN FINDING THAT
THE APPELLANT'S BUSINESS AND PERSONAL EXPENSES APPEAR
TO BE OVERSTATED.
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- STANDARD OF REVIEW.
On appeal of a judgment from the bench after trial, the
appellate court defers to the trial court's factual assessment
unless there is clear error. Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance &
Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988; Eskelsen v. Town of Perry,
819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991).

However, when reviewing trial court's

finding based solely on written materials and involving no
assessment of witness credibility or competency, the Court of
Appeals is in as good a position as the trial court to examine
the evidence de novo and determine the facts, rather than review
the determination under the standard set forth in Rule 52(a); In
re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); also, 11
A.L.R. Fed. 212.
III.
WHETHER THE AWARD OF $250 PER MONTH IN ALIMONY TO THE
EX-WIFE IS CORRECT GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
SHE NOW HAS THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF AT A
STANDARD OF LIVING WHICH IS ACTUALLY GREATER THAN SHE
ENJOYED DURING THE MARRIAGE.
- STANDARD OF REVIEW.
While findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous, conclusions of law are simply reviewed for
correctness without any special deference.

T.R.F. v. Felan, 760

P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah
Ct App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith,
793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The test of whether

termination of alimony is appropriate is whether the wife is able
2

to provide for herself a standard of living equal to that enjoyed
during the marriage of the parties. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh,
786 P.2d 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

IV.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION WAS CORRECT THAT
RELIEF BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO JANUARY 1, 1995
RATHER THAN TO THE AUGUST 10, 1994 FILING DATE OF
PETITION TO MODIFY INVOKING A LUMP SUM OBLIGATION ON
THE APPELLANT OF MORE THAN $12,000, GIVEN A FINDING
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF AS OF THE
FILING DATE AND GIVEN A FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT HAS
NO ASSETS LEFT TO DRAW UPON.
- STANDARD OF REVIEW.
See STANDARD OF REVIEW for Issue III above. Further, a
decree as to alimony must be determined upon facts, conditions
and circumstances of parties in each particular case, and if,
upon examination of the record, the Court holds that the award in
the trial court in inequitable and unjust, it should direct such
a decree as it finds to be just and equitable.

Hendricks, v.

Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 (1936), modified, 91 Utah
564, 65 P.2d 642 (1937) .
V.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN THE FIRST PLACE,
IN HOLDING THE APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT FOR UNDERPAYMENT
OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT WITHOUT FINDINGS
AS TO THE APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO PAY AND IN THE SECOND
PLACE, IN FAILING TO REVISIT THE CONTEMPT MATTER AFTER
MAKING FINDINGS AFTER TRIAL FAIL TO CONTAIN THE
NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF CONTEMPT, AND IN THIRD PLACE, IN
IMPOSING PUNITIVE SANCTIONS UPON THE APPELLANT PURSUANT
TO THE CONTEMPT ORDER.
- STANDARD OF REVIEW.
See STANDARD OF REVIEW, for Third and Fourth Issues above.
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Further, a party may not be held in contempt for failing to make
payments required by a divorce decree in absence of findings that
a proper order had been violated and that the defendant was able
to pay, or intentionally deprived himself of the means of
compliance.

Parish v. McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P.2d 1001

(1934); Hillyard v. District Court, 28 Utah 220, 249 P.806
(1926) .
VI.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ORDERING THE
APPELLANT TO PAY EX-WIFE BACK CHILD SUPPORT FOR 21YEAR-OLD SON FOR THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY
1994, IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,066 ABSENT A FINDING THAT THE
SON WAS ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL
DECREE.
- STANDARD OF REVIEW.
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. Rule 52(a) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is the duty of the trial judge in

contested cases to find facts upon all material issues submitted
for decision unless findings are waived.
567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).

Boyer Co. v. Lignell,

Failure to find upon all material

issues raised by the pleadings is reversible error.

LeGrand

Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originally was initiated when Gail filed for
divorce on December 28, 1992. (C.R. 551)
4

A Default Decree was

entered on January 19, 1993. Ronald, not having been noticed of
the January 19, 1993 hearing, hired an attorney and filed a
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on April 19, 1993. (C.R.
550)

Before the Motion to Set Aside could be ruled upon the

parties stipulated to a modification of the original decree.

On

February 11, 1994, pursuant to the stipulation, an Order
Modifying the Decree was entered.

This action rendered moot the

Motion to Set Aside. (C.R. 549)
On August 10, 1994, Ronald filed his present Petition to
Modify the decree seeking to eliminate the $2,4 65 per month
alimony and reduce child support from $533 per child to guideline
levels.(C.R. 551)

On August 30, 1994 Gail filed an Order to Show

Cause claiming arrearages of child support and alimony.

An

evidentiary hearing was held January 30, 1995 on Gail's Order to
Show Cause.

At this hearing the parties agreed to interim

alimony of $1,000 per month and child support of $533 for the one
remaining minor child giving retroactive effect to January 1,
1995. (C.R. 549) Trial was set for April 26, 1995.
On February 14, 1995 Ronald amended his Petition to Modify
with respect to child support. (C.R. 548)

On April 25, 1995, the

day before the scheduled trial, Gail's counsel requested and was
granted a postponement of trial. At this time, Judge Schofield
disclosed that his daughter worked closely with a member of
Gail's household and some communication had occurred. Ronald's
counsel and the judge did not agree on what was said in the offrecord conversation. Ronald had already traveled to Utah from
5

California when he learned of the postponement and Judge
Schofield's potential conflict.
On May 23, 1995, Gail filed an Order to Show Cause motion
alleging nonpayment or underpayment of interim alimony. (C.R.
548)

On that same date the court signed a proposed Order from

Evidentiary Hearing January 30, 1995 prepared by Gail's counsel.
(C.R. 227) Ron's counsel had earlier filed a timely objection to
the proposed order citing differences in understanding of the
January agreement.

The Order to Show Cause hearing was set for

May 30, 1995 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. (the morning after the
Memorial Day holiday weekend).
but was represented by counsel.

Ronald did not attend the hearing
Ronald was found to be current

on child support but delinquent by $2,000 in interim alimony,
found guilty of contempt for willful refusal to pay $2,000 in
alimony and ordered to pay $350 in fees to Gail.

Further

sanctions against him were reserved for trial. (C.R. 342)
On June 5, 1995, Ronald dismissed his counsel and proceeded
pro se. Also on June 5, 1995 Ronald filed a Request for Recusal
of Judge Anthony Schofield. (See Addendum) On June 7, 1995 Judge
Schofield issued his own minute Ruling denying Ronald's request
for recusal. (See Addendum)

Ronald also filed motions for new

hearings on the January 30, 1995 and the May 30, 1995 rulings.
On June 27, 1995 Ronald served Gail with an Order to Show
cause to be heard July 5, 1995. Ronald requested that the court
allow him to remove Gail as beneficiary of his life insurance and
that she be ordered to receive psychiatric counselling.
6

The

event that gave rise to Ronald's request was a recent - telephone
call from Gail in which she demanded payment and threatened his
life.

Ronald attended the OSC hearing and Gail's attorney

appeared and requested a continuance since Gail was vacationing
in Hawaii.

The continuance was granted and the court ordered

both parties to file witness lists no later than July 21, 1995
since trial was now set for August 3, 1995. (C.R. 347) The court
also continued an OSC hearing requested by Gail that had been set
for July 19, 1995.
On August 1, 1995 Gail's counsel Mark Stringer, citing
personal reasons, requested a further postponement of trial.
Over Ronald's objection the court postponed the trial to
September 14, 1995.
On September 11, 1995 Gail's counsel requested leave to
withdraw which was denied.

Trial was held September 14, 1995

with Gail represented by counsel Mark Stringer and Ronald
appearing pro se.
1995.

Closing arguments were heard September 27,

On January 30, Mark Stringer was disqualified as Gail's

counsel pursuant to a motion brought by Ronald.
The court's final judgment was entered January 22, 1996.
(C.R. 552) Both parties filed timely Motions to Amend or for New
Trial. (C.R. 478) On April 3, 1996 the court issued a Minute
order denying both Motions.

Ronald's Notice of Appeal was filed

on April 30, 1996

7

B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

This appeal turns on three basic facts and circumstances:
1)

The trial judge was presented with a formal request to

recuse himself on June 5, 1996 and on June 7, 1995 the judge
issued his own ruling denying that request, (see Addendum for
Request for Recusal, Ruling thereon);

2)

Based solely upon a reading of Ronald's income tax

return and financial declaration, the court made certain
findings as to his income and expenses which Ronald contends are
clearly erroneous and as such resulted in an unfair judgment.
(See addendum: Findings of Fact, Defendant's Exhibits #3 & #8 and
Ronald's Financial Declaration)
3)

Where the trial court made certain findings which appear

to be accurate, the court drew legal conclusions that in Ronald's
view do not follow those findings, to wit:
a)

The court found that Gail, due to her improved

education and professional status was now employed and
capable of supporting herself at a standard of living
greater than she enjoyed during the marriage, yet failed to
terminate alimony as requested; (Findings of Fact #64, C.R
532 & 540);
b)

The court found that Ronald was entitled to relief

as of the August 10, 1994 date on which he served his
Petition to Modify yet the court ordered relief to be
effective from January 1, 1995 and giving no explanation for
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the delay (Findings of Fact #67, C.R 540, 530) the effect
said timing is to contribute approximately $12,000 to a
total shortfall calculation resulting in a lump sum judgment
of $13,623 which by the court's own finding, Gail neither
needs, nor does

Ronald have the ability to pay;

(Conclusions of Law, C.R. 530, 532)
c)

The court failed to vacate a contempt order

against Ronald made without findings subsequent to the May
30, 1995 OSC hearing even though the findings of fact later
published clearly state that the appellant did not have the
ability to comply with the violated order (ibid.)

Further,

the court added additional sanctions for the contempt
ordering him to perform 50 hours of community service.
(Conclusions of Law, C.R. 529, 530).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
Ronald argues that the trial judge failed to follow the
statute when presented with a formal request for recusal, that
once his neutrality had been questioned the judge should have,
but did not refer the matter to another judge, nor did he recuse
himself as requested as required by Rule 63(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
II.
The court misread Ronald's income tax return and drew
untenable conclusions from information contained therein.
9

Further, the court made augmentations to Ronald's income that are
clearly arbitrary and based upon no particular reason other than
to say that parties almost always inflate their expenses.

The

court also made assumptions about what was or was not included in
the financial declaration when a reading of the detail of the
declaration itself would have obviated the need to make said
assumptions and that said assumptions are simply wrong.

III.
The trial court failed to terminate alimony despite
referring itself to the proper test as contained in
and making findings that affirm the test was met.

Bridenbaugh

The court did

not make the legal conclusion that the findings would reasonably
support.
IV.
Here again, in spite of making findings that Ronald was
entitled to relief as of his August 10, 1994 petition filing date
and that Gail's new professional employment which commenced also
in August 1994, placed her in a self-sufficient condition, the
court concluded that relief should be effective January 1, 1995
and did not explain the reason for this apparent inconsistency.
The explanation the court did give appears to reveal that the
court was probably not cognizant of the pertinent statute
permitting an order to be effective the date the petition is
served.
\\
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V.
The court made no findings at the time it found Ronald in
contempt for "willful refusal" to pay interim alimony of $1,000
per month, therefore it lacked jurisdiction to make such an
order. At trial the Court subsumed the interim order into an
order of only $250 per month saying in effect that the $1,000 was
beyond Ronald's ability to pay.

Notwithstanding these eventual

findings of fact the court without explanation refused to revisit
the earlier contempt order and added criminal sanctions by
ordering 50 hours of community service.
VI.
The court overstepped itf s bounds by concluding that child
support for a 21-year-old son was due for January and February,
1994 where a stipulated modification order filed February 11,
1994 already covered that period of time making the matter res
judicata.

Also the court issued no findings of fact regarding

the child's eligibility for support under the original decree
which was proper because no evidence was taken on the issue.

ARGUMENT
I.
RONALD'S JUNE 5, 1995 "REQUEST FOR
SCHOFIELD" SHOULD HAVE BEEN VIEWED
OR PREJUDICE WITHIN THE MEANING OF
HIS OWN RULING DENYING THE REQUEST
FOLLOW THE LAW.

RECUSAL OF JUDGE ANTHONY
AS AN AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS
RULE 63(b) AND IN ISSUING
THE JUDGE FAILED TO

It should be noted that the document entitled "Request for
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Recusal of Judge Anthony Schofield" was filed by Ronald on June
5, 1995, the very day Ronald dismissed his counsel. Said filing
was Ronald's first act as a party without counsel.

Ronald

believes that the aforesaid document represents his best effort
at conveying to the court his belief that the court's neutrality
had been affected.
Though perhaps unartfully drafted, the document was clear as
to substance and sufficient as to content insomuch that it
contained all the essential elements of an affidavit of bias or
prejudice contemplated in Rule 63(b).

Further, in his own June

7, 1995 ruling denying the request to recuse, Judge Schofield
appears to clearly understand the request and confronts the issue
head-on by offering his own version of the underlying facts.
Ronald does not agree with the judge concerning said facts:
a) Ronald believes it implausible that the communication
between two teenaged co-workers would be limited to what one
girl's mother's attorney thinks of the other's father's abilities
as judge over a complex case.

Indeed, Ronald was informed by his

former counsel that said communications were more prosaic and
included a rendition of facts prejudicial to Ronald;
b) Ronald was further informed by his former counsel that
during the meeting in chambers, the judge offered to disqualify
himself should either party so request;
c)

At no time did Ronald "agree[d] that recusal was not

warranted" as the judge asserts in his June 7 ruling. Ronald,
when asked by counsel if he wanted a new judge responded that he
12

was too upset at that moment to give a thoughtful answer and
wanted time to consider his decision. Ronald was already
distressed to learn upon his arrival in Utah to attend trial on
his petition to modify, that the trial for which he had incurred
considerable expense had that very morning been postponed for
three months at opposing counsel's in-chambers request.
Approximately one month after the judge's disclosure, Ronald
learned of two decisions the judge had recently made which Ronald
considered a manifestation of actual prejudice against him: the
first being the court's May 23, 1995 signing of a proposed "Order
From Evidenciary [sic] Hearing January 30, 1995" over Ronald's
timely objection thereto without first addressing the objection;
the second being the court's finding Ronald guilty of contempt
without a finding of the existence of the necessary elements
thereof.

This contempt order is one of the issues of this appeal

argued hereinafter.
As to the proper course of action when the neutrality of the
judge is questioned the language of the law is clear:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding or his
attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the
judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against
such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, except to call in another judge to hear and
determine the matter."
- Rule 63(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
This Court has further restated the judge's options:
According to Rule 63(b), "once a party or counsel files
an affidavit charging that the judge harbors prejudice
or bias toward the party or counsel, the judge has two
courses of action. First, if the point made in the
13

affidavit is well-taken, the judge can simply recuse
himself and transfer responsibility for the case to
another judge. Alternatively, if the judge 'questions
the legal sufficiency' of the affidavit and accordingly
believes recusal may be unnecessary, then he can refer
the affidavit to another judge to determine whether
there is sufficient rationale in the affidavit to
prompt recusal. No other option is available under the
rule."
- Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah
App. 1994).
In his June 7, 1995 ruling denying the request for recusal, Judge
Schofield appears to be relying upon the Code of Judicial Conduct
which requires a judge to enter his own disqualification in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might be questioned.
(see June 7, 1995 Ruling, page 2). This reliance appears to be
misplaced in this case since his impartiality was in fact
questioned, in writing, by a party.

In the circumstances then

presented, Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should
have been followed.
Ronald believes there can be little doubt that Judge
Schofield did not follow Rule 63(b) when he issued his own minute
ruling denying Ronald's request for recusal.

In a parallel case

the Utah Supreme Court opined,
"If this rule means anything at all, it means what is
plainly stated to the effect that the judge against
whom the affidavit of bias and prejudice [is filed]
thereafter cannot proceed to hear the issue himself.
Our only conclusion is that any order of judgement
based on evidence thereafter taken by him would be
ineffective against the affiant. It follows that this
case must be remanded for another trial on the
issues." Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d
265 (1962).
Justice McDonough further observed that there might be merit in
an argument that a Judge's refusal to comply with Rule 63(b)
14

"might be indicative of the asserted prejudice; and somewhat
demonstrates the wisdom the rule itself." Ibid.
It will be shown that subsequent rulings by the trial judge
in the instant case appear to validate the observation of Justice
McDonough.
II.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS WITH REGARD TO RONALD'S BUSINESS AND
PERSONAL EXPENSES ARE BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION
OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND ITS CONCLUSIONS DRAWN
THEREON ARE UNTENABLE.
Judge Schofield lists 89 "findings of fact" in his ruling.
Number 51 thereof reads:
"Gail disputes Ronald's claimed expenses. For example
in 1994 he incurred $11,772 in secretarial expenses,
yet his new wife Sharon, from whom he rented his office
space, incurred no secretarial expenses for her travel
agency. This gives rise to the question of whether
Ronald included his wife's agency's secretarial
expenses with his own business expenses. Further, in
1994 Ronald paid $7,800 in rent for office space in a
building owned by Sharon. Sharon's total mortgage
payment for the building is $11,008. She runs her
travel agency in the building and she rents another
space to a third party for $2,104. Between the rental
payments from Ronald and the third party, she covers
almost all of her mortgage expense even though she also
runs her travel agency from the building. This gives
rise to the question of whether Ronald is claiming
Sharon's agency's rental expenses with his business
expenses."
In "Finding" number 52 the judge concludes:
"It is unfair for Ronald to cover all of these expenses
for his wife's business. I divide each in half and
conclude that for 1994 he had net income of $32,501
(22,715 claimed net income + 1/2 X 7,800 + 1/2 X
11,772)."
In an effort to marshal evidentiary support for the above, Ronald
finds only Defendant's Exhibit #3 - "1994 Joint Federal Income
15

Tax Return" filed by Ronald and his new wife. All the financial
data analyzed by the court are contained in this one document.
Though her trial counsel presented theories in his opening
argument, no evidence was presented at trial that might suggest
any challenge by the appellee to Ronald's claimed expenses. The
trial judge's conclusions, which are stated above, hang solely
upon his analysis of the two Schedules "C" contained in Ronald's
1994 Joint Income Tax Return (Defendant's Exhibit #3) - one
Schedule "C" for Ronald's financial services business, the other
for the travel agency business owned by Sharon, Ronald's new
wife.
It should be noted that Part "II", line 26 of Ronald's
Schedule "C" is labelled "Wages" and there is no amount entered
there.

However, in Part "V - Other expenses" there is an entry

labelled "secretarial expenses" showing the amount of $11,772 to
which the judge refers.
The trial judge erred when he based his conclusion of
improper allocation of expenses upon his observation that Sharon
"incurred no secretarial expenses for her travel agency." It is
probable that the judge compared the Parts "V" of each Schedule
"C" and found no entry on Sharon's Schedule "C" for "secretarial
services" as is found on Ronald's Schedule "C". The judge failed
to observe that Part "II", line 26 of Sharon's Schedule "C" lists
the amount of $28,737 as "wages" expense.
The trial judge also erred in finding Sharon's total
mortgage payment for the building to be $11,008. Actually the
16

amount the court cites was taken from line 16a, Part "II" of
Sharon's Schedule "C" and represents only the interest portion of
her mortgage.

The judge fails to take into account the other

expenses associated with building ownership, including insurance,
maintenance, repairs, property taxes and utilities all of which
are itemized therein.
Nevertheless, these facts are immaterial since it is not
proper to consider _size of mortgage payment as a basis for
imputing rents. Rents are determined by the marketplace.

It is

common knowledge that mortgage payments can vary dramatically,
not only with various interest rates, but with the level of
equity the owner holds.

By the judge's reasoning, an owner who

has invested all cash into the purchase of her building and
therefore has no mortgage, would not be entitled to the same rent
as an owner who invests little cash and consequently has a very
large mortgage payment.

Nor, in the judge's view, would an owner

be properly entitled to free rent for her own business located in
her own building after having made a substantial cash investment
in that building.

Such conclusions are obviously untenable.

A.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT RONALD'S SECRETARIAL
EXPENSE AND OFFICE RENT SHOULD BE REDUCED BY ONE-HALF IS
ARBITRARY AND AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND MAY RUN
AFOUL OF UTAH'S CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT.
The trial judge concludes, in effect, that Ronald's claimed
expenses are overstated.

Such a conclusion is supported only by

the misreading of documentary evidence and untenable analysis

17

discussed above and is contrary to other evidence in the record
as Defendant's Exhibit #8 - "The Price of Independence." (See
Addendum)

This document lists the national averages for expenses

incurred by all independent financial services offices affiliated
with the same company as the one operated by Ronald.
According to Defendant's Exhibit #8, the national average
for secretarial services expense is $14,400 per year (12 X
$1,200).

Yet Ronald claimed only $11,772 which is $2,628 or 18%

below the national average.

The same evidence also shows a

national average for rent and utilities totalling $9,420 per year
($650 X 12) + ($135 X 12). Yet Ronald paid just $7,800 rent in
1994 (including utilities) which is $1,620 or 17% less than the
national average.

One might argue that national averages don't

apply in every case because rents and wages can vary from state
to state.

Such an observation is true enough, however Ronald's

office is located in the state of California where judicial
notice can be taken that rents and wages tend to be above the
national average.
It would appear that the intended effect of the trial
judge's conclusion that certain of Ronald's expenses are
overstated is to form a financial basis for an order of child
support and alimony that could not be otherwise justified.

In

this regard it is curious that the only expenses the judge
questions are those which involve or may involve Sharon, Ronald's
new wife.
This fact seems to suggest that the judge may harbor a
18

belief that Sharon may have substantial assets that should be
factored into this case* However, Utah's Civil Liability For
Support Act requires that the obligation of child support rests
solely with the natural or adoptive parents:
"Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating
each parent's share of the base combined child support
obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive
parents of the child may be used to determine the award
under these guidelines." - Sec. 78-45-7.4 Utah Code
Ann.
Defendant's Exhibits #5 and #6 were introduced at trial to show
that Sharon made withdrawals from Jier G.I. Global mutual fund
account during 1994 totalling $25,000 and that these withdrawals
were necessary in order to meet household shortfalls created by
her husband's (Ronald's) diminished ability to pay the nearly
$3,000 per month in support payments to the his ex-wife. (See
Addendum)
It follows that the judge's actions in shifting a portion of
Sharon's income away from her and onto Ronald has the effect of
placing part of the burden for support on Sharon's shoulders and
runs afoul of Sec. 78-45-7.4. Knowing that there could be a
tendency with some obligor parties to attempt to conceal income
by various means including improper payments to a new spouse it
is possible therefore to understand a trial judge's tendency to
scrutinize the data.

However, no such attempt to conceal or

misrepresent is evident here.

Ronald paid more support than

would have been considered xeaiistic by any objective standard
(See Conclusions of Law - Alimony and Child Support Reduction,
first paragraph, C.R. 532). In the instant case, the court's
19

presumption of guilt is arbitrary and as such appears to be a
veiled attempt to circumvent the statute against inclusion of
income of a non-parent. There is much wisdom in preventing the
courts from taking into account the income or assets of a new
spouse for she is not a party to the matter and may have other
children to support or financial burdens she must bear and about
which the court would have incomplete knowledge.

Excessive

support orders that adversely impact upon the standard of living
of a new spouse are patently unfair and can lead to new marital
strain or worse.
B.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING RONALD'S PERSONAL
EXPENSES GENERALLY AND HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
SPECIALLY ARE ERRONEOUS ON THEIR FACE.
In "finding" #65 the trial judge writes:
"Ronald asserts living expenses of $2,538, claiming
that this amount is one-half of the actual expenses for
him and his new wife Sharon. I assume that this
includes his child support obligation of $298, since he
has never denied that he owes at least $300 per month
in child support. Since no evidence of these expenses
was provided, I am unable to evaluate their accuracy,
although Gail did not attacK Ronaldfs statement of
expenses on cross-examination." (C.R. 540)
Ronald cannot reconcile the judge's assumption that his financial
declaration already contains his child support obligation of $298
per month.

It is Ronald's understanding that the purpose of the

financial declaration is to determine such obligation and indeed
there is no place on the declaration form for such an amount
except as applies to obligations from a prior marriage. Further,
it was unnecessary for the judge to assume at all where each item
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is specifically listed and it is clear on its face that no such
deduction is contained therein.
The effect of the judge's assumption that child support is
already included is to further create artificial capacity to pay
alimony as evidenced by his "finding" #66:
"Ronald has monthly income of $2,708 per month, or a
surplus of $170 above his expenses. Assuming there is
some fluff in his living expenses, as there almost
always is, I conclude Ronald has some greater capacity
to pay alimony. I fix alimony in the sum of $250 per
month."
Not only does Judge Schofield inflate Ronald's income by denying
his proper business expenses as argued above, the judge here
again misconstrues the documents before him resulting in a
mistaken and unfair conclusion that Ronald has capacity to pay
alimony.
The judge inflates Ronald's capacity even further by making
yet another assumption that there is "some fluff J_n his living,
as there almost always is." The Financial Declaration is
understood by Ronald to be a sworn statement made under penalty
of perjury and was prepared by Ronald without assistance from
counsel.

Ronald went to trial ready to show proof of every item

thereon and that he rounded down so as to better withstand the
anticipated scrutiny of cross-examination.

Ronald takes great

exception therefore to the judge's assumption as to "fluff" and
feels he has been prejudiced by the fact that lie was not crossexamined on these expenses.

Further, Ronald feels it is

prejudicial to assume wrongdoing in a particular case based
solely upon wrongdoing in other cases involving other parties.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED IT'S OWN FINDINGS AND FAILED TO
FOLLOW THE LAW IN AWARDING CONTINUED ALIMONY.
The test for determining whether alimony should be terminated has
been well defined by this Court:
"In order to reduce or terminate alimony, the court
'must be persuaded that appellant will be able to
support herself at a standard of living to which she
was accustomed during the parties' marriage, or that
respondent is no longer able to pay.'" Bridenbaugh v.
Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241,242 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)
quoting Fullmer, v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988).
In "finding" #64 Judge Schofield writes, "While Gail may consider
the modification of her alimony to be a harsh .result, the
standard of living which she has maintained since the separation
has exceeded that which she enjoyed during the marriage.." (C.R.
541)

Further, in his "Conclusions of Law - Alimony and Child

Support Reduction", first paragraph therein, the judge writes,
"On the other hand, Gail has completed her college
training, obtained a teaching certificate and found
employment as a full-time teacher. She now has the

ability to support herself at a standard of living
which is actually greater than she enjoyed during the

marriage,
largely because of Ronald's seal, at the time
of the divorce, to undertake an unrealistic support
obligation" [emphasis added]. (C.R. 532)
It is apparent that the judge confuses the "standard of
living" test with a cash flow shortfall to which he refers in his
"finding" #59 (C.R. 542) and which he apparently uses as a basis
for awarding her alimony even though under the Bridenbaugh
alimony is not warranted.
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test

IV.
THE JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT RELIEF BE EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1,
1995 IS BASED UPON AN APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW.
The record shows that the Petition to Modify was served upon the
appellee on August 10, 1994.

In his Conclusions of Law - Changed

Circumstances—Ronald" paragraph four, Judge Schofield writes,
"In 1994, the year, that Ronald petitioned for the
modification at issue here, his total income had
dropped to $32,501, or an average of $2,708 per month
(imputing income to compensate for overstated
expenses)." (C.R. 535)
Further, in "finding" #67 the judge begins with the following:
"Given the significant decrease in Ronald's capacity to
pay, it is clear he would have been able to establish
an entitlement to a reduction in alimony at the time
that he filed his petition to modify." (C.R. 540)
Given the judge's own findings and conclusions, relief
should have been, and ordinarily would have been granted
effective as of the August 10, 1994 petition notice date were it
not for the judge's apparent lack of cognizance of the pertinent
statute.

According to the statute,

"A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any
period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition
was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the
petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the
petitioner." Sec. 30-3-10.6(2) Utah Code Ann.
Evidence that the court was unaware of the foregoing statute
which would have permitted an earlier effective date can be found
in the court's findings indicating relief was warranted as of the
August 10, 1994 petition date as expressed in "finding" #67
quoted above. The judge explained his decision to set relief
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effective as of January 1, 1995 with the following:
"Given the significant decrease in Ronald's capacity to
pay, it is clear he would have been able to establish
an entitlement to a reduction in alimony at the time
that he filed his petition to modify. Further much of
the delay in bringing this matter to trial is Gailfs
fault, rather than Ronald's, because Gail and her
counsel requested inappropriate discovery and sought
continuances based upon personal circumstances over
which Ronald had no control. The matter first was set
for hearing in January, 1995. By that time Ronald
clearly was entitled to relief. For those reasons, I
conclude that alimony should be adjusted to $250 per
month from January, 1955 to the present." - Finding of
Fact #67. (C.R. 540)
In the foregoing explanation, the judge appears to be
struggling for a rationale for giving any retroactive effect at
all to his order, citing delays in bringing the matter to trial
which were not the fault of Ronald.

This explanation is repeated

in his "Conclusions of Law - Delinquent Support," paragraph four,
"In fixing these amounts, I give retroactive effect to
January, 1995 of the modification here order. Ronald
served Gail with his petition to modify in August 1994
and the matter first was set for hearing in January
1995. In January 1995 Ronald's circumstances were such
that this Court would have granted him relief if the
matter had been heard at that time, and I find much of
the fault for the delay in bringing this matter to
trial to rest at Gail's doorstep. Accordingly I give
retroactive effect to this modification to January
1995." (C.R. 530)
Again, the judge appears to be trying to justify giving any
retroactive effect at all and at no time considers the
possibility that retroactive effect might have been given to the
August 10, 1994 petition date as allowed by the statute.
Failure to set relief effective as of the August 1994
petition date results is grievous consequences for Ronald making
him liable for four months of support payments at the previous
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"unrealistic" rates which Ronald cannot pay and for which Gail
did not have need given her employment.

In his "Conclusions of

Law - Changed Circumstances—Gail" (C.R. 535,534) the judge
confirms that Gail has been in her current full-time teaching
position since August 1994. (C.R. 540)

Based upon these findings

then can the Court acquiesce to a ruling that allows the previous
order of alimony of $2f465 and child support in the amount of
$533 per month to continue four months beyond the date of the
filing of the Petition to Modify?

This misplaced effective date

creates a support arrearage for 1994 of $13,623. (see
"Conclusions of Law - Delinquent Support" last paragraph, C.R.
529). The egregiousness of this result is laid bare by the
court's own "Conclusions of Law - Alimony and Child Support
Reduction" paragraph one, wherein the judge concludes, "he
[Ronald] has no assets left to draw upon."

{C.R.

532)

V.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ORDER FINDING RONALD IN CONTEMPT AND ORDERING
HIM TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE RULED NULL AND VOID FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION.
Appellant was absent from a hearing on an Order to Show
Cause scheduled for May 30, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. (the morning after
the Memorial Day Holiday).
His former counsel was in attendance and Ronald was standing
by at a telephone in California at his counsel's suggestion
should a need arise. Without making any findings of fact, the
court ordered Ronald in contempt for falling behind in his
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payments, ordered him to pay $350 in attorneys fees with further
sanctions to be reserved until trial.

This order was filed on

July 5, 1995 but not signed by the court as Ronald had filed a
timely objection thereto.
After trial the judge refused to revisit the contempt order
in spite of the fact that his findings as heretofore shown,
revealed that Ronald did not the have capacity to pay the amount
required by the temporary order.

It is well-established in law

that a party cannot be found guilty of contempt where,
" »* * * A S disclosed by the record, no findings of
fact were made1 nor was it 'otherwise stated that the
defendant had property, means, or present or any
ability to comply with the decree or any part of the
judgment or any order of the court with respect to the
payment of any of the default payments, or that the
defendant had willfully refused to pay any of such back
installments, or that he had intentionally deprived
himself of ability to comply therewith nor is it
recited or otherwise indicated that the order of
contempt or commitment was based on any evidence
adduced before the court or on which the order of
contempt and commitment was based. Because of the
failure of the court to make findings in one or more of
such particulars or the equivalent thereof, unless
waived, of which there is no evidence, the order or
judgment of the court adjudging the defendant guilty of
contempt for failure to pay the installments as decreed
has no support, and thus was rendered without
jurisdiction, and is null and void.1" Parish v.
McConkie, 35 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1934) quoting from Ex
parte Gerber, (Utah) 29 P.2d 932, 933 and Hillyard v.
District Court, 68 Utah, 220, 249 P. 806
The trial court's initial order of contempt, though never
signed, was not supported by the required findings. When
findings were made subsequent to trial, those findings fail to
support a contempt order, yet the order of contempt was not
revisited in the final judgment except to add criminal sanctions
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upon Ronald (see "findings" #86 & #87, C.R.537, 536).
In "finding" #83, the judge reasserted his previous order
awarding $350 in attorney's fees pursuant to the May 30, 1995 OSC
hearing.

Yet in "finding" #84, he plainly states, "Ronald does

not have the capacity to pay Gail's attorney's fees.

Further, he

substantially prevailed in his Petition to modify. It is
inappropriate for him to pay Gail's attorney's fees. None are
awarded." (C.R. 537) Here the trial court made no finding of
capacity to pay attorney's fees pursuant to the May 30, 1995
hearing other than that finding pronounced above.

It would

appear from the circumstances that the order of attorney's fees
was intended as punishment against Ronald and not designed to
remedy any deficiency.
In his "finding" #87 and "Conclusions of Law - Sanctions"
the trial judge ordered Ronald to perform 50 hours of community
service "as sanctions for Ronald's contempt". (C.R. 536)

Such

sanctions do not remedy an alleged deficiency as required by
civil contempt conventions, but are designed instead to punish
Ronald in order to uphold the integrity of the court.

Such

sanctions constitute criminal contempt sanctions and cannot be
imposed without proper due process.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT MADE A CALCULATION OF SUPPORT
DUE FOR 1994 WHICH INCLUDED A TWO-MONTH PERIOD ALREADY
COVERED BY A PREVIOUS MODIFICATION ORDER AND ASSUMED ALL
CHILDREN WERE ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPORT DURING SAID PERIOD.
In his "Conclusions of Law - Delinquent Support" third
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paragraph, Judge Schofield calculates the amount of child support
that should have been due for 1994 under a combination of the
original order, the first amended order and the new order• (C.R.
530) Where the original order specified child support be paid at
the rate of $1,600 per month for three children as long as
certain conditions were met. No testimony was ever rendered or
evidence received that would indicate whether or not the 21-yearold son stood in compliance with these requirements during the
first two months of 1994.

The matter was considered moot by the

parties who themselves believed that said child was ineligible
due to his attainment of age 21 in August 1993 as provided by the
stipulated modification order entered February 11, 1994. Since
the parties both saw the matter as moot, no evidence was
submitted so no findings on this issue were made.
Should the evidence, had any been taken, have shown that the 21year old was not living at home in the months of January and
February 1994, and attending college, as required by the original
decree,then the amount of child support due for those months
would be reduced by $1,066 (2 mos X $533).

This condition was

not considered by the trial court in making the calculation for
1994 child support due.
Further, even had there been a showing that the 21-year-old
were eligible for support prior to the first modification, any
questions of arrearages on the original order should have been
addressed in the first modification.

Therefore, the inclusion of

any alleged arrearages predating the February 1994 modification
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order must be barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

CONCLUSION
Since the findings and conclusions under appeal either turn
upon the documentary evidence or involve questions of law raised
in the final order, the Court of Appeals is in as good a position
as the trial court to assess the facts and circumstances and to
review the case de novo.
"Appellate court's review of decision allowing natural
mother to revoke her consent to adoption was de novo; where trial
court's decision was rendered solely on basis of documentary
evidence." In re Infant Anonymous, 7 60 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); also, 11 A.L.R., Fed. 212, § 5.
Should the Court agree that the trial judge failed to comply
with Rule 63(b) in denying the appellant's Request for Recusal,
in the interest of time and economy, the appellant would request
a non-deferential de novo review of the issues rather than a
remand for new trial which would be the course followed in the

Anderson

case.

Therefore, the appellant seeks the following relief:
1)

Render ineffective any judgment against the appellant

entered by Judge Schofield after June 5, 1995 on the grounds
that the judge failed to properly address the recusal
request as mandated by the rule;
2) Review the issues presented herein de novo and find:
a)

That the court below improperly and erroneously

imputed additional income of $9,786 per year to Ronald
through a defective analysis of Ronald's 1994 Joint
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Income Tax Return and Financial Declaration ana that
Ronald's proper expenses both business and personal are
as reported in the aforesaid documents;
b)

That it is unfair to continue alimony beyond the

August 10, 1994 Petition date and that it be
terminated as of said date as well as the requirement
to name Gail as beneficiary on Ronald's life insurance;
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both oarents as set forth in the oarties' Financial
Declarations;
d)

That order entered against Ronald in his absence

at the hearing of May 30, 1995 be vacated or pronounced
null and void, including the order of contempt and
attorney's fees and sanctions imposed or reasserted in
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copying, binding and delivery costs of $200,

DATED;

September 4, 1996
RONALD C. MONKS
Appellant, Pro Se
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF by depositing the same in the U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, on the 9th day of August, 1996, addressed
to the following:
Keith L. Barton
165 West Canyon Crest Road
Alpine, Utah 84004
DATED this 9th day of August, 1996 ^ O

by:

l/(frn
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Income Tax Return and Financial Declaration and that
Ronaldfs proper expenses both business and personal are
as reported in the aforesaid documents;
b)

That it is unfair to continue alimony beyond the

August 10, 1995 Petition date and that it be
terminated as of said date as well as the requirement
to name Gail as beneficiary on Ronald's life insurance;
c)

That child support be set at the guideline amount

for one child and based upon the levels of income of
both parents as set forth in the parties' Financial
Declarations;
d)

That order entered against Ronald in his absence

at the hearing of May 30, 1995 be vacated or pronounced
null and void, including the order of contempt and
attorney's fees and sanctions imposed or reasserted in
the final order;
3)

Order a refund of filing fees and cost bond as well as

copying, binding and delivery costs of $200.

DATED:

~J?d7k^Jl_
RONALD C. MONKS

August 8, 1996

Appellant, Pro Se
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF by depositing the same in the U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, on the 9th day of August, 1996, addressed
to the following:
Keith L. Barton
165 West Canyon Crest Road
Alpine, Utah 84004
DATED this 9th day of August, 1996 / O

by:
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